Category: Industry

Aircraft, Crew, Maintenance, and Insurance (ACMI) leasing has become an increasingly essential strategy for airlines to address operational challenges. Factors such as delayed new aircraft deliveries, supply chain constraints leading to parts shortages, prolonged maintenance turnaround times, and overall operational limitations continue to drive demand for ACMI solutions. Under such circumstances, we have assessed which airlines have been heavily utilizing the fleet from specialist ACMI providers.

Below are the top ten airlines with the largest passenger fleet sourced from ACMI providers in July 2024 (Northern Hemisphere Summer). Note this does not include “traditional” airlines categorized as non-ACMI providers under Cirium Fleets Analyzer (e.g. Finnair wet-leasing their A330s to Qantas, or AirBaltic wet-leasing their A220s to Lufthansa Group).

	Airlines	Jul-2024	Fleet from ACMI
1	Lufthansa Group	35	E190 E1/E2, CRJ1000, A320
2	THY (Ajet)	25	A320, A321, 737 Max 8
3	TUI Group	24	A320, 737-800, 737 Max 8
4	VivaAerobus	21	A320
5	SAS	20	CRJ900
6	Indigo	16	A320
7	Air France-KLM Group	13	E190 E1, A319, A320, A330-200
8	Condor	9	A320, A321
8	Wizz	9	A320, 737-800
10	Jet2	8	A320, A321
Others		118
TOTAL		298

Source: Cirium Fleets Analyzer

The above list reflects a diverse mix of airlines, including full-service carriers, low-cost carriers (LCCs), regional airlines and freighter operators.

In contrast, when examining the top ten airlines in January 2025 (Northern Hemisphere Winter), we observe shifts in rankings, with some airlines increasing or decreasing their fleet from specialist ACMI providers, while others have been completely removed from the list.

	Airlines	Jan-2025	vs Jul-2024
1	VivaAerobus	24	3
2	Indigo	18	2
3	Lufthansa Group	23	-12
4	SAS	15	-5
5	THY (Ajet)	13	-12
6	Condor	7	-2
7	Air Peace	6	6
7	Air France-KLM Group	6	-7
9	Saudia	4	-1
9	Air Arabia	4	1
9	El Al	4	1
9	Azerbaijan Airlines	4	1
9	PSA Airlines	4	1
Others		76	-69
–	TUI Group	2	-22
–	Jet2	0	-8
–	SunExpress	0	-7
TOTAL		204	-94

Source: Cirium Fleets Analyzer

It is notable that while flag carriers such as Lufthansa Group, THY (through it’s subsidiary Ajet), Air France-KLM Group and SAS sees some reductions but continue to utilize ACMI provider’s fleet in January 2025, leisure and tour operators have significantly scaled down or completely phased out these fleets. The most striking example is TUI, which returned most of its 22 aircraft that were in operation in July 2024 by January 2025 to ACMI providers. Similarly, Jet2 and SunExpress, both of which had incorporated ACMI provider’s fleet in July 2024 (with eight and seven aircraft respectively), fully discontinued their ACMI provider’s fleet utilization by January 2025. This is understandable given the larger fluctuation in peak and off-peak demand for leisure and tour operators. In contrast, Indigo has maintained (or in fact slightly increased) their fleet from ACMI providers, primarily to compensate for ongoing groundings of its owned and leased aircraft due to Pratt and Whitney’s GTF engine issues.

Operator Region	Jul-2024	Jan-2025	Jan-2025 vs Jul-2024
Europe	199	87	44%
Africa	31	23	74%
Asia Pacific	26	32	123%
Latin America	24	35	146%
Middle East	13	20	154%
North America	5	7	140%
TOTAL	298	204	68%

Source: Cirium Fleets Analyzer

The above chart highlights that Europe remains the largest market for ACMI provider’s fleet utilization. It is interesting to see Africa ranks as the second-largest market, despite its relatively smaller aviation sector compared to other continents. A significant portion of ACMI demand in the Asia Pacific and Latin American markets is driven by Indigo and VivaAerobus; excluding the two airlines would result in a substantial reduction in ACMI provider’s fleet usage in these regions (Turkey is categorized as part of “Europe” under Cirium Fleets Analyzer). Furthermore, European airlines have significantly reduced their ACMI provider’s fleet utilization in January 2025, whereas other regions have shown an overall increase, with the exception of Africa, which experienced a slight reduction. This may be attributed to a combination of factors, including seasonal fluctuations in air traffic (including countries in the Southern Hemisphere), and non-seasonal challenges that necessitate ACMI use, as observed in IndiGo’s case).

As mentioned above it is important to note that this assessment does not completely capture the impact of the full wet-lease demand in the market as we have not assessed wet-lease provided by “traditional” airlines. However even within this scope, we can observe the distinct variations in airline requirements and/or operational strategies regarding ACMI utilization.

The decade of the 2010s saw tremendous growth of the leased fleet size (~88% in total), but also the entrance of many new operating lessors, leading to fragmentation of the fleet. In 2010, two lessors, GECAS and ILFC accounted for nearly 40% of the leased fleet. By the end of the decade, eight lessors would share the 40%. The number of managers classified as operating lessors with at least one aircraft in service or stored increased from 143 to 186. 90% of the leased fleet went from being shared amongst 41 lessors to 63.

The pandemic put the brakes on lessor trading as aircraft values fell and later rising interest rates increased lessor cost of capital. With defaulting lessees and geopolitical shifts, the trend reversed towards more consolidation, at least on the level of the largest lessors. The chart below tracks consolidation of the lessor fleet. The difference between the green and black line shows the fragmentation and growth trend of the 2010’s. The red line, representing today’s fleet, is above the black line but the shift is mostly noticeable for the largest lessors. The largest consolidation that can be spotted from the chart intercepting the y-axis is AerCap’s 2021 acquisition of GECAS.  However, for half a decade of trend, consolidation has not moved very quickly, particularly compared to the speed of change observed in the previous decade.

Lessor Fleet Distribution Over Time

Source: Cirium Fleets Analyzer, Narrowbody and Widebody Jets, Commercial usage, excluding unconfirmed lessors. Note: Avolon acquisition of Castlelake portfolio accounted for in February 2025 data.

The yellow line, which is barely visible due to its overlap with today’s fleet, represents the picture at the very start of 2024. The past 13 months had a large “consolidation” event in the Avolon acquisition of a 106 aircraft portfolio from Castlelake. While it is significant in rearranging the size rankings of the two lessors in question, it does not do much to change the landscape. DAE Capital’s planned acquisition of Nordic Aviation Capital is a very significant consolidation event, but mostly involving regional aircraft so does not affect this analysis which focuses on narrowbody and widebody jets.

New entrant activity continued at a slow pace to dampen the consolidation trend. IAT Leasing took out an advertisement at Dublin Airport to catch the eye of those flying in to attend the Airline Economics Growth Frontiers conference in January 2025. They now have nine aircraft on lease including three A330-200s. Notable new entrants from earlier in the decade which have managed to grow beyond a 40 aircraft portfolio include AviLease, SKY Leasing, Griffin Global Asset Management and Vmo Aircraft Leasing. Gaining scale has been challenging, however, with only Avilease breaching the 100-jet mark following its 2023 acquisition of Standard Chartered’s aircraft leasing business.

Lessor fleet distribution change since 2024 has been minimal:

Number of lessors	1-Jan-2024	Feb-2025
35% of leased fleet	6	6
50% of leased fleet	11	12
90% of lease fleet	62	61
100% of leased fleet	191	190

Source: Cirium Fleets Analyzer, Narrowbody and Widebody jets, Commercial usage, in-service/stored fleet, excluding unconfirmed lessors

Will the consolidation trend pick up again in 2025? Cirium reported in an interview that Stratos chief Gary Fitzgerald, who contributed to the consolidation trend in 2023 with the acquisition of Magi Partners, believes the industry would benefit from consolidation as some leasing platforms have underperformed. Carlyle Aviation Partners’ Robert Korn also suggested that the recent strength of the US dollar should make for a good exit opportunity for some lessors. Carlyle was a driver of consolidation as well with its 2021 ACMK acquisition. Economies of scale do exist for aircraft leasing to a certain extent, which should favour some consolidation. Perhaps the lessors with the lowest cost of funding will take the opportunity to grow their scale – if they find a lessor willing to sell. While there are good reasons for consolidation to occur, it remains to be seen if conditions will finally warm to allow it.

On 1 February 2025, the Trump administration announced three Executive Orders that will significantly affect tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and China. The modifications regarding tariffs on goods from China and Hong Kong took effect on 4 February while those related to Canadian and Mexican imports are set to be paused until March 2025. Although similar measures were first introduced in 2018 during Trump’s first term as President, the 2025 tariffs are anticipated to exert a more substantial impact on the air cargo sector due to their broader scope.

With these stringent tariffs in place, what are the implications for the aviation market, particularly in the air cargo sector and freighters?

When the initial tariffs on steel and aluminium imports were implemented in March 2018, followed by several rounds of tariffs on Chinese goods, air cargo demand began to slow. While full-year air cargo demand growth in 2018 remained positive at 3.5%, it was significantly lower than the 9.0% and 9.8% seen in 2017 and 2016, respectively. In 2019, air cargo demand subsequently declined by 3.9%.

The new tariffs introduced in 2025 include a “de minimis” provision, which applies to packages valued under $800. This provision, previously exempted in 2018, has been extensively utilised by online retail giants from China, such as Shein and Temu, enabling them to offer goods at remarkably low prices and contributing to their growing popularity. In 2023, approximately 30% of U.S. online shoppers reported purchasing items from China. While specific data on the percentage of total imports falling under the de minimis threshold is not readily available, it is estimated that a significant portion of low value e-commerce shipments will be affected by these new tariffs.

The Trend of Global Air Cargo Supply and Demand

Note: CTK: cargo-tonne-kilometre ACTK: available-tonne-kilometre
Source: IATA; Cirium Ascend Consultancy analysis

Despite the decline in air cargo demand in 2019, the global freighter fleet experienced growth. According to Cirium data, the number of widebody and narrowbody freighters in service increased by 4% and 5% respectively in 2019, while their average daily utilisation rose by 2% and 5%. This suggests that the tariffs imposed in 2018 did not significantly hinder freighter operations. In fact, the rising demand for domestic consumption in both China and the U.S. may have positively influenced narrowbody freighters. This trend is evidenced by global capacity (available cargo ton kilometres), which recorded consistent year-on-year monthly increases throughout 2019, culminating in a moderate 2.1% rise for the full year.

However, the combination of declining demand and increasing supply resulted in a 2.6% decrease in load factor, negatively impacting the profitability of freighter operators, particularly in less efficient international operations. The data indicates that the tariffs enacted in 2018 introduced some challenges, underscoring the complex dynamics of the global trade environment, but there were not insurmountable.

The Fleet of Narrowbody and Widebody Freighters

Source: Cirium Core

The effectiveness of the new tariffs in significantly reducing the US deficit and improving economic conditions remains uncertain. However, one certainty is that air cargo demand may be expected to decline. The extent of this decline will depend on the scope and coverage of the tariffs. Despite the potential short-term turbulence in specific markets, such as China and the US, demand for freighters seems unlikely to be significantly affected. Air cargo demand is projected to continue growing in the long term. However, small widebody freighter operators with a focus on the China-US market may face challenges if the tariffs are prolonged. These operators, with their smaller fleet sizes, might struggle financially under extended tariff implementations.

Many questions remain as a consequence of early policy initiatives from the new US administration, but it is clear that the aviation market will need to closely monitor developments and adapt accordingly to maintain efficiency and competitiveness in a rapidly evolving geo-political environment.

As 2025 opened, the team at Cirium Ascend Consultancy brought together its collective intelligence and insight to estimate how many commercial passenger jets Airbus and Boeing would deliver to customers in 2025 and beyond. Based upon our Cirium Fleet Forecast, plus many years of collective experience, we concluded that Airbus could ship as many as 900 units whilst Boeing might show a strong recovery this year to deliver around 550 passenger aircraft amongst an overall total of 610 commercial jets.

Projecting annual deliveries has become increasingly difficult over the past few years, driven initially by the demand uncertainty induced in the early days of the pandemic but then exacerbated more recently by supply-side uncertainty arising from supply-chain delays and other disruptions at the airframe OEMs. Prime amongst those supply-chain delays have been the engine OEMs. Most specifically, issues within the new-generation CFM Leap and Pratt & Whitney PW1000G programmes have reportedly paced single-aisle deliveries (along of course with Boeing’s own self-induced 737 Max challenges) have caused fewer than expected deliveries from both OEMs.

As a consequence, Airbus delivered 674 single-aisle aircraft last year (599 A320 family and 75 A220s) and Boeing managed only 258. Within our projection of 2025 deliveries, we include an expectation of around 680 A320 family, 100 A220 and 450 737 Max. If these forecasts are to be achieved, and by the way our projections require Airbus to improve 2025 output by around 20% over 2024 and Boeing to increase by 80%, the respective supply chains become pivotal. Both GE and RTX (P&W) have made forward-looking statements in the past 10 days, so we can potentially use those to work out if our projections are credible.

GE noted that it delivered 1,407 Leap engines and expects to increase production by between 15% and 20% in 2025. RTX itself was silent on the number of engines produced but did say it expected to increase large commercial engine output by around 14% whilst at the same time seeing a “modest tilt towards more installs”, indicating airframe OEMs may expect to see slightly more of the 2025 output than they did in 2024. What do these numbers mean?

If GE achieves the mid-point of its planned increase, that would imply around 1,650 engine deliveries in 2025. If we assume that around 20% of these are spare engines, higher than our typical spares assumption but maybe consistent with market demand given Leap is just now starting to see higher volume of first shop visit, then that would yield around 690 shipsets for airframe OEM installation.

At P&W it is a little harder, but we saw around 350 Airbus aircraft deliveries with PW1000G engines in 2024, equating to 700 installed engines. If we assume spares were around 20%, then that implies 840 total engine deliveries last year. Increase by 14% takes us to around 960. Then assume 15% spares this year and we have around 830 engines or 415 installed shipsets.

The overall total of 1,105 engine shipsets is low when compared to the 1,230 deliveries projected above. Of course, Boeing started 2025 with more than 100 737 Max in inventory, including 34 which have already been delivered this year and another 52 737-8/9 variants which almost certainly will be. Those bring the 1,105 total to 1,190, but that is still some 40 aircraft lower than our demand-driven projections. Max volumes could increase further if the 737-7 is certificated this year, with 27 of those in inventory. But that remains highly uncertain for now.

In summary, most recent outlook statements by engine OEMs do suggest that our 2025 delivery projections have downside risk. Last year, we opened with an expectation of more than 1,500 deliveries between Airbus and Boeing, a projection that was iteratively reduced through the year until we arrived at the final much lower totals. It does seem that we may see a similar experience this year, albeit the shortfall looks potentially much smaller given the numbers above.

Finally and with all this in mind, how does January look? I am writing this on the final day of the month and as we stand today (and recognising data lag), initial experience doesn’t look promising. Cirium’s fleet researchers have to date captured details of only two A220, 15 A320 family and 38 737 Max deliveries in January 2025. The first month of the year always features low delivery volumes. Airbus’s January A320 output has ranged between 15 and 32 on an annual basis since 2018, but last year it shipped 26 aircraft so 2025 looks to be lagging that. Boeing typically does a bit better in January and, as already noted, this month’s total to date of 38 does include a vast majority of aircraft which flew for the first time last year or earlier.

Hence, January doesn’t tell us too much other than it is going to be another challenging year both for OEMs and for those of us who love to make short-term forecasts.

Read Part One and Part Two of Do airline dreams come true?

In the previous Cirium Ascend Consultancy Team Perspective, I looked at some examples of airline order backlogs, and how they can easily change over time, see deferrals, or even disappear altogether. This week, I look at the opposite viewpoint. In other words, which airlines are likely to place additional orders in the near future? Have these carriers played it clever, exhibiting sound fleet management, or have they missed the boat in terms of securing fuel-efficient next generation replacements?

Again, all fleet figures refer to single-aisle and twin-aisle passenger aircraft, both in service and stored, operated by airlines.

Current Order Status

The concept of being ‘underordered’ is not that simple. Backlog-to-fleet ratio is a good measure, and if this is above 1.0, clearly the airline is either planning to grow rapidly, or it plans to replace all its current fleet. If the ratio is 0.4 or 0.5, this could well be sufficient for medium-term planning. Variables include market growth rate, the age distribution of the current fleet, as well as the competitive position of the airline. It is necessary to consider the airline group, rather than individual operators or brands, to get the full picture.

The chart below includes airlines or airline groups that have at least 100 aircraft in service today, and have backlog-to-fleet ratios below 0.4. The average age of the current fleet varies widely, between 8-16 years.

Chart 1: Largest ‘underordered’ airlines

Source: Cirium Schedules data, Cirium Ascend Consultancy analysis

Eight of the 22 airlines shown are major network carriers in North America and Europe. They are in slow-growing mature markets, generally own rather than lease their fleets, and also tend to keep aircraft until final removal from service and retirement. Within these, all but Alaska Airlines have average fleet ages above 12 years. Delta and American have the oldest fleets, at 15.5 and 13.8 years respectively. Even allowing for slower growth and older retirement policy, clearly some of these, particularly Air France/KLM Group and IAG, could readily use additional new-generation aircraft. These would cut fuel costs and help airlines reduce their emissions in-line with commitments to Net Zero.

ANA is in a similar situation, with just 59 aircraft on order, and a backlog-to-fleet ratio of just 0.24. However, it does have a younger fleet age profile.

Ryanair has comparatively few aircraft on backlog. After taking delivery of its remaining 38 737 Max 8-200s, it has a backlog of 150 Max 10s. However, in its investor update, it does state it has 300 Max 10 aircraft on order, implying its Letter of Intent (LoI) for another 150 units is almost certainly to be converted to a firm order soon.

Several airlines in Latin America have smaller backlogs at present. However, many in the region have gone through restructuring process, and are traditionally reliant on leasing, so it may be expected some of their shortfall in orders will be met from lessor backlogs.

What About China?

The lack of backlog for Chinese airlines is very apparent. This is a market that grew at 13.3% per annum between 2009 and 2019, and took delivery of 2,900 jets in the decade. Fleets Analyzer data shows just 550 Airbus and Boeing aircraft on order for Chinese airlines today, plus another 475 C919s. Even including the COMAC aircraft, this gives a backlog-to-fleet of just 0.25.

However, there are 1,100 Airbus and Boeing aircraft recorded as being on order for ‘unannounced commercial customers’. Several hundred of these are likely to be for Chinese airlines and leasing companies. The actual destination of these often only becomes apparent at delivery. At this point Boeing unveils ‘unidentified customers identified at delivery’. For example, in its December 2024 data Boeing listed three aircraft delivered to Chinese airlines that were ordered in 2014 and 2016, having lain as unannounced customers for a decade!

In summary, the real backlog for Chinese airlines is higher than 1,025 units, but even so, the country’s airlines will require more aircraft. The obvious conclusion is that they will rely on COMAC to fill the gap, in order to obtain the 400 new aircraft per annum that are called for in the latest Cirium Fleet Forecast.

Lessor Backlog

Chinese operating lessors currently have 495 C919s on order that are not allocated to a specific airline. This highlights an alternative source of new aircraft for airlines that are late to the current order cycle. There are just over 1,400 Airbus and Boeing aircraft on order with lessors with unknown lessees. Obviously some of these will already have been placed with airlines, but they have not been made public yet. Thus it is possible that some of the airlines highlighted as being ‘underordered’ may already have sourced some additional aircraft from the lessor backlog.

For any of the airlines with low backlog-to-fleet ratios that are looking to acquire new aircraft via lessors, they will still have to get in line for a delivery slot. The A320neo and 737 Max families are now sold-out for several years, but even unplaced lessor slots are limited in the next two years as shown in the slide.

Chart 2: Unplaced operating lessor backlog

Source: Cirium Fleets Analyzer, Cirium Ascend Consultancy analysis

Conclusions

Earlier, we highlighted how some airlines have placed huge orders that don’t always come to 100% fruition, for multiple reasons. However, there are currently several large airlines or airline groups that could be considered to be underordered, especially considering the long lead-times required from an order placed in 2025 to delivery.

The first available OEM slots for 737 Max and A320neo family types, as well as twin-aisle 787s and A350s, are now likely to be in the early 2030s, so airlines may have to consider alternative sources of supply. One is via lessors, but how many of their 1,400 unplaced aircraft are really available? There is some earlier OEM availability on the A220 and A330neo, so we may see more interest in these types. It also seems clear that China will look towards the C919 programme to help fill its lack of backlog for Airbus and Boeing single-aisles.

History teaches us that opportunities sometimes arise to reallocate aircraft from airlines that have ordered too many aircraft, or those that find themselves in financial problems. Price escalation is also an issue for some orders placed many years ago, such that an airline may seek to renegotiate its order backlog.

However, deals such as these cannot be done without the full agreement of the aircraft manufacturers themselves, as they retain ownership of the delivery slots. Boeing has recently undertaken a major exercise to find homes for 737 Max aircraft that were originally destined for China. Many have been delivered to India, helping that fast-growing market obtain earlier capacity. In the past, well-capitalised airlines in the US and Europe have obtained slots that have been deferred by airlines during economic downturns. Might we see nearer-term slots at overordered airlines in Southeast Asia become available, or even backlogs transferred to lessors?

In conclusion, some airlines may wish they had placed orders earlier in the post-Covid recovery cycle, but there are always ways that enable a win-win for both airframer and airline when the latter is seen as a ‘strategic customer’.